D Day: TacAir Omnipotent: Mortain and the Falaise-Argentan Pocket

TacAir Omnipotent: Mortain and the Falaise-Argentan Pocket

Mortain and Falaise, like Wadi el Far'a, Guadalajara, and more recently Mitla Pass and the Kuwait City-Basra Road, have come to symbolize a particular form of warfare: the destruction of closely packed columns of troops and vehicles by constant and merciless fighter-bomber strikes in concert with action on the ground. Any chance of withdrawing with troops, equipment, and vehicles in good order was lost to the Wehrmacht due to the violence of the breakout from the beachhead at Normandy, and Hitler's order to von Kluge to stand firm in Normandy. As a result of Hitler's directive, the Wehrmacht launched a general offensive against Mortain, the weakest spot in the Allied line, on August 7. It failed amid stubborn resistance on the ground and intensive fighter-bomber attacks.

Next Allied forces began to batter the enemy ground forces caught in the Falaise-Argentan pocket-fighting characterized by combined infantry-armor-artillery-air attacks directed against units desperately attempting to escape eastward. Though some German forces did escape through the ever-narrowing gap, they did so without equipment and in a state of disarray and almost complete demoralization. By the end of August, Allied forces had liberated Paris, advanced to the Seine, won the Battle of France, and set the stage for the Battle of Germany. Ahead lay some particularly bitter fighting-notably Montgomery's botched airborne invasion of Holland and the ferocity of the German counterthrust in the Ardennes. But as of the end of August, only the most ardent Nazi would still have faith in an ultimate German victory.

The attack on Mortain was allegedly revealed by Ultra-the Allies' breaking of the German codes-so that the American forces were able to set up their defense in advance of the German thrust. This might be called the "myth of Mortain." In fact, Ultra did not offer a forewarning enabling the defenders to prepare for the attack. On August 2, Hitler had ordered von Kluge to prepare for an attack westward to the coastline, but this early indication of trouble ahead did not make its way from the Allied intelligence organizations to Bradley's 12th Army Group. On the evening of the 6th, orders went out for five Panzer divisions to attack through Mortain (which had already fallen to American troops) ninety minutes later-at 1830 hours. Ultra did not send out this message until midnight, but the German attack had itself been delayed in the field until just after midnight. The Allied signals arrived immediately before the German attack, offering the Americans no time whatsoever to make extensive plans or redeployments for the assault.

Bradley, in his autobiography A General 's Life is understandably testy about allegations that Mortain was predetermined by Ultra intelligence. His argument that he waged the battle without benefit of forewarning is borne out by the account of former Ultra intelligence analyst Ralph Bennett, who refreshed his own recollections by extensive research into the actual Ultra messages themselves. Bennett has stated that German update information during the Mortain fighting furnished "cheerful reading" to the analysts, but added little, if anything, to the information Bradley and Montgomery already had in the field from their own combat intelligence operations.

When the Ultra message did come in, Bradley ordered "all-out" air support the following morning, by which time the American 30th Infantry Division was locked in desperate and stubborn combat with the German tanks. Even here Ultra played only a minor role, since the midnight attack would have triggered a day of Allied air support anyway, from battlefield requests. During this fighting, the rocket-firing Typhoons of the RAF' s 2 TAF had the responsibility of defending the ground forces and attacking German columns, while the AAF's Ninth AF flew interdiction and air superiority sorties. For the Mortain operation, the Luftwaffe centralized its few fighter resources and attempted to intervene over the battlefield, but the deep cover American air superiority sweeps gobbled them up as they took off, and "not one" (as Lieutenant General Hans Speidel dismally recalled) appeared over the battlefield. The skies over Mortain belonged to the RAF. The weather was poor in the early morning, but as the day went on, the overcast lifted and patches of blue appeared. As the weather improved, Typhoons swarmed over the area, so many, in fact, that some got in each other's way, and several mid-air collisions apparently resulted. A morning recce flight located German tanks near St. Barthelemy, and thereafter, between the first engagements (just after noon) and late afternoon, Typhoons flew a total of 294 sorties over the battlefield.

Typhoon pilot John Golley left a graphic account of operations at Mortain, particularly the battle between 245 Squadron (which was especially active) and the 1 SS PanzerDivision on the road near St. Barthelemy. Their first attacks sprayed the tanks and transports with rocket and cannon fire, and a thin haze of smoke and dust spread slowly over the Norman countryside. The Typhoons broke off as they exhausted their ammunition and rockets, returning again and again to their strip to refuel and rearm. So intensive were the sortie rates that 245 Squadron, ever afterward, referred to August 7 as "The Day of the Typhoon."

German commanders were shocked at the magnitude of the air attacks at Mortain, which would be repeated before the month was out at Falaise. On the ground, the 30th Infantry Division stood firm, repulsing the German forces that did close to engage them. Air had saved the day at Mortain, at least preventing a local German success that might have prolonged the campaign in France. As Eisenhower reported:

The chief credit in smashing the enemy's spearhead, however, must go to the rocket-firing Typhoon planes of the Second Tactical Air Force. They dived upon the armored columns, and, with their rocket projectiles, on the first day of the battle destroyed 83, probably destroyed 29 and damaged 24 tanks in addition to quantities of "soft-skinned" M.T. [Motorized Transport]. The result of this strafing was that the enemy attack was effectively brought to a halt, and a threat was turned into a great victory.

With the Nazi spearhead smashed, Mortain degenerated into a five-day slugfest. Foolishly, for a time the Germans continued to press toward Avranches, a move Bradley subsequently termed "suicidal," for Collins's VII Corps was in position to attack the German flanks. Elements of the 2 SS Panzer Division, operating south of the devastated 1 SS Panzer Division, besieged Hill 317, in whose shadow Mortain is nestled. The defenders, a lone battalion, stood firm. Supported by Allied air (including supply drops) and artillery, this battalion heroically held out until relieved by the 35th Division on August 12. Mortain came to an end. In the fighting after August 7, the 2 SS Panzer had joined the rapidly growing roster of German armored formations shattered by Allied combined air-artillery-armor assault. Major General Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, the chief of staff of the German 7 Armee, subsequently agreed that the continuation of the counterattack toward Avranches was a "mistake." Contributing to the German failure was the overemphasis of attacking north, between Mortain and Vire rather than farther south. In any case Mortain must be counted among the most important battles in the west and recognized for what it was-a true example of air-land action. It set the stage for the next and even greater disaster to befall German arms in France-the battle of the Falaise-Argentan pocket. After Mortain, the only course open to the Wehrmacht was headlong retreat toward the German frontier. In that retreat, Allied tactical air would offer no respite.