NEVER SAY FLEET

by
Phil Rowe
During the early development of the B-1 bomber, the original B-1A canceled in the Carter years, I was assigned to the Air Force's project office at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. There I learned an important lesson.

We conducted a scenario-based war gaming study supporting engineering design trade-offs. By simulating deployment of B-1 forces in a computerized exercise, we hoped to predict the effectiveness of the developing B-1 in terms of the reliability and behavior of its major subsystems.

My Program Director, a two-star general, was advised by a friend from Strategic Air Command (SAC) that I was both an engineer and an experienced aircrewman in strategic aircraft (B-52's and B-58's). I was a logical choice to direct this war-gaming exercise, there being no other Program Office people (available) with that mixture of flight operations and engineering experience.

Well, to use an Army phrase, I was 'old soldiered' into the assignment and soon found myself in charge of the project.

The B-1 war gaming exercise was complicated. It included participants from Rockwell International, SAC Headquarters, USAF Headquarters and several others agencies. We were to develop a computerized representation of a force of B-1's, supported by tanker aircraft, in a simulated mass deployment against a truly representative threat situation.

We were to predict how many aircraft could complete their missions, how many put could weapons on targets and how on-board systems would affect the outcomes. SAC planners were very concerned with how well they could make the scenarios as realistic as possible. Much effort went into making technically and politically correct assumptions.

A project steering committee was established in the Pentagon, Chaired by a two-star general. My orders were to direct the B-1 war gaming project, under the guidance of the steering committee, and to report progress, problems and results to them.

Because the project depended upon the participation and support from SAC Headquarters personnel, I was also accountable to them and obliged to brief the CINSAC from time to time.

We built a super-secret facility within the Rockwell plant at Los Angeles airport and, after obtaining security clearances on the facility and its personnel, assembled the team. Higher headquarters interest in the project was intense, requiring me to travel to Dayton, Washington and Omaha regularly to brief the generals.

We had nearly completed the study and repeatedly run the computers to simulate various B-1 mission scenarios. We ran the baseline scenario and various excursions to assess a number of factors which might bear upon both design and tactics options. And we had a preliminary set of results which we were ready to report.

I prepared, with much help from my SAC colleagues and the Rockwell staff, a presentation based upon the baseline scenario predicting the outcome of number B-1's deployed under realistic conditions, from Alert Scramble to post-strike landings.

My flight to the Pentagon to report to the steering Committee included a courtesy stop to Headquarters SAC. I had to give the Commander-In-Chief of Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC) a preview of my briefing. I arrived at Offutt AFB, Nebraska around four in the afternoon on a Sunday, prior to the scheduled briefing early the next morning.

The presentation went very well with the CINCSAC. He was not only keenly interested in the study, but very well-informed about the factors which influenced the results. He pleased with the fleet survival numbers predicted and the realism of our assumptions. The presentation took only 30 minutes, leaving me free to continue on to Washington for my presentation to the steering committee that afternoon.

I got to the Pentagon after lunch and proceeded to the regular meeting room. At two o'clock the generals, and many accompanying colonels, assembled around the conference table. My SAC-Colonel friend, the one who got me into this, offered to change viewgraphs for me.

The committee listened intently and carefully studied the material presented. All went well until I got to the slide that addressed FLEET SURVIVAL. That particular slide, of great interest to the SAC Commander as well, was my downfall before the committee chairman.

He did not argue with the data. In fact, he even agreed that the results seemed reasonable. But, what he was greatly upset by ... no, enraged by, was the title FLEET SURVIVAL. "Damn it, Colonel", he roared ,"That's a Navy term. It doesn't belong in an Air Force briefing. Here, give me that slide, right NOW!"

The startled generals and colonels around the table looked at one another in surprise. I was somewhat in a state of shock, but handed the offending slide to the General. He pulled out his ball-point pen and excitedly punched holes through the slide. He destroyed it with great Gusto, while the audience burst into laughter. But, I didn't know whether to join in the laughter or just what ought to do.

That interruption didn't do much for my confidence in the rest of the presentation. Somehow I managed to finish, but it all seems a blur in my memory. Mercifully, the briefing ended without further difficulty.

I had learned, the hard way, that Air Force people NEVER say "Fleet" when referring to a large force of airplanes. That term is, after all, a Navy one.